Currently I'm reading Elizabeth A. Wilson's Psychosomatic: Feminism and the Neurological Body and thinking about the relationship between biological reductionism and biological determinism. Previously, I've lumped the two together in a kind of causal relation whereby reducing humans to physiological processes alone entails a kind of determinism--i.e., those processes get credited with everything that follows, and even the notion of “following,” in that it presumes a body-before-culture, is a huge problem. In other words, biological reductionism and biological determinism fall in the same category in which the South Park school counselor puts drugs and alcohol, "Baad, 'nkay?"
But now Wilson is helping me imagine the possibility of a more productive, strategic kind of reductionism, which is less reductionism and more scrupulous focus on physiological processes, their changes, their movement, the way they are intertwined with other movements deemed less physiological--meaning making and language use, for example.
And her move to boldly and rigorously rethink terms that have been all but banned from academic vocabulary (in the humanities anyway) has me thinking too about a broader issue: the further I get from graduate school, the more suspicious I become of the habit of avoiding certain words.
An anecdote may help here: at MLA I met a friend of mine from grad school chaffed at my description of the paper I was to give there, which was going to talk about how ancient rhetoric as a field suffers from conflicting identity crises by its affiliation with classics on the one hand and rhetoric on the other.
He screwed up his face at the term “identity,” something our grad school theory profs had little patience for, and he proposed that we should talk about “alterity crises.” But just how reflective is my friend’s find-and-replace tactic? Can’t we do better than a covert insertion of a new term? I am of course well-schooled in all the issues that rage around something like identity politics, and this isn’t meant to be about that particular term as it is about these sorts of flaggy words in general.
It seems to me that one way to come to terms with these sorts of terms is by carefully considering the various fractious debates that have led to their suspension, and either looking for something the debates are missing, or asking what is lost through the jettisoning of a particular term. Jonathan Arac is currently writing a genealogy of the notion of identity, I imagine, for these very reasons. It may be that certain concepts have run their course and others are more useful or specific. But to use an analogy Kenneth Burke used for aesthetics in the 30s, if we take one last look around before clearing out, we might be surprised what we find, and what we find may change the whole place.
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